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We investigate the question of ‘why customary macroscopic entities appear to us humans
as they do, i.e., as bounded entities occupying space and persisting through time’, starting
from our knowledge of quantum theory, how it affects the behavior of such customary
macroscopic entities, and how it influences our perception of them. For this purpose,
we approach the question from three perspectives. Firstly, we look at the situation from
the standard quantum angle, more specifically the de Broglie wavelength analysis of the
behavior of macroscopic entities, indicate how a problem with spin and identity arises,
and illustrate how both play a fundamental role in well-established experimental quantum-
macroscopical phenomena, such as Bose-Einstein condensates. Secondly, we analyze
how the question is influenced by our result in axiomatic quantum theory, which proves
that standard quantum theory is structurally incapable of describing separated entities.
Thirdly, we put forward our new ‘conceptual quantum interpretation’, including a highly
detailed reformulation of the question to confront the new insights and views that arise
with the foregoing analysis. At the end of the final section, a nuanced answer is given
that can be summarized as follows. The specific and very classical perception of human
seeing—light as a geometric theory—and human touching—only ruled by Pauli’s exclusion
principle—plays a role in our perception of macroscopic entities as ontologically stable
entities in space. To ascertain quantum behavior in such macroscopic entities, we will need
measuring apparatuses capable of its detection. Future experimental research will have to
show if sharp quantum effects—as they occur in smaller entities—appear to be ontological
aspects of customary macroscopic entities. It remains a possibility that standard quantum
theory is an incomplete theory, and hence incapable of coping ultimately with separated
entities, meaning that a more general theory will be needed.
Keywords: human perception, quantum theory, macroscopic entity, separated entities, concepts, objects,
quantum effects, quantum axiomatics
1. INTRODUCTION
Why customary macroscopic entities appear to us humans as
they do, i.e., as bounded entities occupying space and persisting
through time, is a fundamentally puzzling question. It is puzzling
because such macroscopic entities are built from microscopic
physical entities, which are well described by quantum theory,
and, following the quantum description, we know that these
microscopical physical entities are ‘not at all bounded entities
occupying space and persisting in time’ (Planck, 1901; Einstein,
1905; de Broglie, 1923; Heisenberg, 1925, 1927; Schrödinger,
1926a,b; Bohr, 1928; von Neumann, 1932; Einstein et al., 1935;
Bohm, 1952; Bell, 1964; Jauch, 1968; Piron, 1976). The question
of how ‘constitutions of microscopic entities that are fundamen-
tally not localized in space-time’ build up to the ‘customary
macroscopic entities’ in a way that is compatible with howwe per-
ceive their behavior, is not only a theoretical conundrum. Indeed,
many experiments have been performed showing that when-
ever entities on larger scales are pushed in delicate and specific
ways to show quantum effects, such as entanglement, non-locality
and interference, they reveal ‘aspects of ’ this quantum behav-
ior (Rauch, 1975, 2000; Aspect et al., 1981, 1982; Tittel et al.,
1998; Weish et al., 1998; Arndt et al., 1999; Aspelmeyer et al.,
2003; Salart et al., 2008; Gerlich et al., 2011; Herbst et al., 2012;
Bruno et al., 2013). Such experiments have meanwhile reached
the astonishing scales of distances of 143 kilometers in the case of
entanglement, and sizes of large macro- and bio-molecules in the
case of interference (Gerlich et al., 2011; Herbst et al., 2012).
On the other hand, there is now a level of great detail and
consistency in the way the theoretical framework of quantum
theory accounts for the core of the weird behavior of micro-
entities, and the penetration of aspects of this weird behavior
into our everyday macroscopic world. This level of detail reveals
the type of consistency which entails that approximate explana-
tory visions cannot be considered to be serious explanations of
the matter. By ‘approximate explanatory visions’ we mean more
concretely the original explanatory vision involving particles and
waves (de Broglie, 1923, 1928). In one of its developments, it
puts particles and waves in a dual mode with respect to each
other—the so-called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum the-
ory (Bohr, 1928), where the question of whether an entity entails
particle or wave behavior depends on themeasurement being per-
formed upon it—while in another of its developments, it attempts
to consider both of them as existing at once—the so-called
de Broglie-Bohm interpretation of quantum theory (de Broglie,
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1923, 1928; Bohm, 1952), where both particles and waves together
and aligned constitute the quantum entity in all of its behavior.
Although these wave-particle visions have succeeded in putting
forward explanations for some of the quantum behavior, they fail
to do so for several other aspects of quantumphenomenology that
have now been well established, also experimentally. In what fol-
lows, we will first explain how they succeed in accounting for the
weird quantum behavior to a considerable extent, and then dis-
cuss the aspects of this behavior where they fail in providing an
explanation.
2. WAVES, PARTICLES, SPIN, AND IDENTITY
The main explanatory aspect of the wave-particle vision with
respect to the question of ‘why macroscopic entities behave clas-
sically, i.e., as bounded entities occupying space and persisting
through time’, is already contained in the original formula put
forward by de Broglie (1923)
λ = h
p
h = 6.62 · 10−34J · s (1)
where λ is the de Broglie wave length of an entity withmomentum
p, and h is Planck’s constant. The idea is that quantum behavior
within a collection of entities, e.g., a gas of particles, only appears
when the de Broglie wavelengths of various of these entities can
overlap, i.e., they are bigger than the typical distance between the
entities. Indeed, only in this case can quantum coherence as an
effect inducing the other aspects of quantum behavior manifest
itself sufficiently. To give an idea, the de Broglie wavelength of a
relativistically moving electron is of the order of magnitude of one
nanometer = 10−9 meters, which is the same order of magnitude
as the size of an atom. This means that the de Broglie waves of
electrons inside an atom overlap heavily. However, a car driving
down the highway has a de Broglie wavelength of the order of
magnitude of 10−38 meters, which is extremely small. This means
that de Broglie waves of two cars on a highway will never overlap.
Why use this criterion of ‘overlapping’? The mechanism imagined
in the wave-particle vision is the following. Consider particles in a
gas that are (almost) at rest, and hence have de Broglie waves with
large wavelengths that overlap widely. The waves can then start
to vibrate in phase, join together to (more or less) form a sin-
gle wave. The effect of the behavior of different particles melting
together to the behavior of one wave pattern, hence of one par-
ticle, is called quantum coherence. Of course, for a real gas, such
a situation can only occur at very low temperatures, since heat
adds energy and hencemomentum to each of the particles, so that
their de Broglie wavelengths will become smaller and smaller, to
the extent that the waves no longer overlap. It should be noted
that the pure effect of becoming smaller is not what makes quan-
tum behavior disappear. It is the non-globally structured way in
which the wavelength decreases that destroys the quantum coher-
ence. Indeed, heat is intrinsically a non-structured random way
of adding energy, which is why ‘it is a process profoundly disturb-
ing the quantum coherence’. The different entities, i.e., particles of
the gas, that at low temperatures were united into onemacroscop-
ically sized de Broglie quantum wave, start to get disconnected,
their de Broglie waves being pushed out of phase as a consequence
of the collisions with random packets of heat energy. This means
that with rising temperature the gas starts slowly to become a col-
lection of separated particles, behaving classically with respect to
each other. Let us remark that a collection of cars on the highway,
within this explanatory scheme, is still a collection of quantum
entities, but with de Broglie wavelengths that are so small, and
heat disturbances so huge, that the different de Broglie waves
would never be able to cohere, and hence no quantum effects can
be observed.
The wave-particle explanation has an intuitive appeal for a
very specific reason, because we can all experience the very sim-
ilar effects of real wave-like phenomena in our everyday world.
For instance, imagine you are in a playground with your chil-
dren, and you are pushing a swing with one of them on it. We all
know from experience how this only works when the frequency
of our pushes ‘resonates’ with the eigenfrequency of the swing-
with-child. Now suppose there are two people pushing the swing,
one at either side, this will only work if the frequencies of the
two pushing adults are coherent, sufficiently similar, i.e., overlap
in the time-dimension. This is much more difficult to accom-
plish in the case of high frequencies—imagine a tiny miniature
swing with a very high eigenfrequency being pushed by two per-
sons using their fingertips. The reason is very similar, for with
higher frequencies, the effects of the random disturbances that
we experience with respect to our attempts to control our move-
ments in finding the coherence with the eigenfrequency of the
swing become more prominent. This means that it will become
more and more difficult to realize the required coherence as the
frequency increases.
The frequencies considered in the above swing example are the
analog for time of what wavelengths are for space. But we can
easily find an example in space where also our intuition readily
lets us understand the wave-particle explanation presented above.
Imagine a bath tub filled with water, and two persons on either
side moving their hands rhythmically to make waves in the water.
If the wavelengths of the water waves are of the order of magni-
tude of the size of the bath tub, the waves made by one person will
interfere with the waves made by the other person. This is actually
what will normally happen when water waves are made by hands
moving up and down in the water on both sides. However, waves
with smaller wavelengths will not have the same effect. Let us con-
sider sound waves in the air, for example. Interference of sound
waves is a well-known phenomenon, giving rise to volumes of the
sound going up and down, the so-called ‘beating sounds’. Two
tuning forks whose tones slightly differ and hence produce sound
waves with different wavelengths, will produce such a beating
effect when sounding together, as a consequence of the interfer-
ing sound wave. However, tuning forks are built on purpose from
the right material and in the right form to enable them to pro-
duce the pure type of eigenfrequency and create very pure, almost
plane waves, i.e., with wavelengths that remain the same over large
distances. For sound produced by entities not designed for such
pure results, interference is a much less obvious phenomenon.
The above wave-particle explanation of ‘why macroscopic
entities, such as cars, do not show quantum effects, although
within the wave-particle vision they too would be quantum enti-
ties’ may not be incorrect in principle—based as it is on the idea
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of coherence at the origin of quantum effects, and de-coherence
as a consequence of random disturbances—but it is incomplete.
For example, it does not provide a satisfactory explanation for
the quantum phenomena linked to ‘spin’, which is a fundamental
property of all microscopic entities. The name ‘spin’ was given
to this quantum property, because in the early days physicists
thought it was an expression of angularmomentum on themicro-
scale. We now know that the property ‘spin’ is not really the
angular momentum of a micro-particle, but rather a genuinely
new type of quantum property without any obvious classical
equivalent, although it structurally does indeed show significant
similarities with angular momentum. Nor does the wave-particle
vision provide a satisfactory explanation for the quantum phe-
nomena that are linked with situations of identical entities, and
they are numerous. As we will see in the following of this arti-
cle, most of the spectacular realizations of quantum phenom-
ena on the macroscopic level—superfluidity and supercurrency
(London, 1938; Josephson, 1962; Gravroglu and Goudaroulis,
1988)—are related to spin and to identity of entities, and in most
cases even to both.
Every micro particle has a property called ‘spin’, which can
essentially be half-integer or integer in value, but is always quan-
tized, i.e., it never takes continuous values. Being always quantized
can be understood within the wave-particle vision, spin being
analogous with angular momentum. Indeed, consider a micro-
particle rotating around itself and also being a wave. For it to
be coherent with itself, the wave-pattern will have to repeat
itself after a rotation, and this requirement leads to quantiza-
tion, different possible modes being solutions. This is interest-
ing to note, because a new aspect of the wave-particle vision
appears, namely coherence with itself. However, things become
more difficult to explain within the wave-particle vision if we
point out the so-called ‘spin-statistics’ relation, formulated at
the end of the 1930ies, first by Markus Fierz, and subsequently
by Wolfgang Pauli (Fierz, 1939; Pauli, 1940). The relation was
eventually proven in the context of relativistic field theory, but
the proof remains obscure and still has not provided a satisfac-
tory explanation (Pauli, 1950; Streater andWightman, 2000; Jabs,
2010).
The relation between ‘spin’ and ‘statistics’ in the form of the
‘spin-statistics’ theorem can be stated as follows: “For a situation
of identical integer-spin particles, the wave function describing
the state of such particles remains unchanged when the particles
are permuted. We call these types of wave functions ‘symmet-
ric’ and the particles described by it, ‘bosons’. For the situation
of identical half-integer spin particles, the wave function describ-
ing the state of such particles changes sign when the particles
are permuted. We call these type of wave functions ‘asymmetric’
and the particles described by it, ‘fermions’. ” Hence, the spin-
statistics theorem states that integer spin particles are bosons,
while half-integer spin particles are fermions. What is interest-
ing, is that the spin-statistics theorem implies that half-integer
spin particles, hence fermions, are subject to the Pauli exclusion
principle—only one fermion can occupy a specific quantum state
at a specific time—, this follows directly from the asymmetry of
the wave function. Indeed, suppose that we consider two fermions
in the same state; in this case, a permutation does not change
anything, since they are in the same state, but, because of its
asymmetry changes the sign of the wave function. This is only
possible for a wave function equal to zero for the fermions in the
same state. For integer-spin particles, i.e., bosons, with a symmet-
ric wave function, there is no restriction in occupying the same
state.
This difference between fermions and bosons has a dramatic
influence on the way both types of particles behave statistically,
in other words, when for example they appear in great quanti-
ties, in the form of solids, liquids or gasses. Two very different
types of statistical behavior have been given the names of ‘Fermi-
Dirac-statistics’ and ‘Bose-Einstein-statistics’. The difference in
behavior is very fundamental and gives rise to very different types
of compound structures. It can, for example, be proven that
bosons cannot give rise to stable forms of matter, and as a con-
sequence all matter is formed by fermions, i.e., fermions are the
basic building blocks of matter (Dyson and Lenard, 1967; Lenard
and Dyson, 1968; Lieb, 1976, 1979; Muthaporn and Manoukian,
2004). Electrons are fermions, which is why only two of them can
be in the same lowest-energy state, one with its spin in one direc-
tion, and the other one with its spin in the opposite direction.
A third electron necessarily needs to be in a higher-level energy
state, and so forth for subsequent electrons. This means that the
whole range of atoms in the periodic table, giving rise to all the
variety in chemistry, mainly finds its origin in the special way
in which spin 1/2 quantum particles behave as identical entities,
namely fermions.
Bosons are the particles that carry the interaction fields of
the forces. We can understand by intuition that fermions, more
specifically, electrons, neutrons, and protons, can form building
blocks for matter. Indeed, matter takes up space, and this can be
imagined to come about because the basic blocks cannot be in the
same state. Hence, the spins of these building blocks of matter—
electrons, neutrons and protons—entail a type of pressure called
‘degenerative pressure’ that prevents them from merging into the
same state. This ‘degenerative pressure’ pushes combinations of
fermions to become bigger and bigger, where we use the word
‘bigger’ in its specific meaning of ‘taking place within a region
of more space, whenever they are forced to take place’. Photons
are bosons and have spin equal to 1, hence they are not con-
fronted with ‘degenerative pressure’, which means that many of
them can be in states that are very similar, even equal. So, differ-
ent photons can in principle be in one and the same state. The
realization of a ‘laser’ is essentially based on this possibility. The
word ‘laser’ stands for ‘light amplification by stimulated emis-
sion of radiation’, and it was Albert Einstein who laid the basis for
the quantum-mechanical mechanism of absorption, spontaneous
emission and stimulated emission that guides it (Einstein, 1917).
What essentially happens in a laser is that an enormous amount
of photons is produced, but in such a way that they are in states
that are coherent in space as well as in time. In the limit, they are
actually all in one and the same state, including the ‘wave-aspects’
of the state, i.e., the ‘phases’. Concretely, photons of a laser beam
therefore do not only have the same wavelength and frequency,
but are also ‘in phase’, whichmeans that they have the same phase,
and hence are in the same state, which is only possible because
photons are bosons.
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We have so far considered the fundamental difference in statis-
tical behavior of fermions and bosons by looking at two examples,
electrons as fermions, and their statistical behavior within atoms,
giving rise to all of the properties of chemistry, and photons as
bosons, and their statistical behavior within laser light, giving rise
to our first example of a macroscopic quantum system. However,
both electrons and photons, as far as we know today, are elemen-
tary particles, i.e., they have no known constituents, and to date
all attempts to find any such subentities have failed. That is why
they are considered to be really elementary. However, the fermion
and boson nature of quantum entities is also apparent in com-
posite quantum particles, such as atoms and molecules. And in
this respect an additional amazing aspect of quantum physics is
revealed, which is that also for such composite particles the rela-
tion between spin and statistics remains valid, and ‘spin adds up
and does so following the mathematics of a vector in a small and
finite dimensional vector space, called Hilbert space’.
Let us illustrate the above with two examples. There are two
isotopes of the atom Helium, namely Helium-3, with a nucleus
consisting of two protons and one neutron, and Helium-4, with a
nucleus consisting of two protons and two neutrons. Protons and
neutrons are fermions, both with spin equal to 1/2. What are the
spins of the Helium-3 and Helium-4 isotopes?Well, spins of com-
pound quantum entities are the vector sums of the spins of their
constituents, so that, in case they are aligned, they can be summed
or subtracted numerically. This means that Helium-3, consisting
of three particles with spin 1/2, will have spin 1/2 or 3/2, but in
any case half integer. While Helium-4, consisting of 4 particles
with spin 1/2, will have spin 0, 1 or 2, but in any case integer.
The spin-statistics relation is also valid for compound quantum
entities, which means that Helium-3 is a fermion, while Helium-
4 is a boson. And both indeed behave statistically in this way,
with Helium-3 being faithful to the Pauli-exclusion principle—
no two Helium-3 entities are encountered in the same state—,
and Helium-4 allowing to be pushed all into the same state. This
is not just theory but can also be realized experimentally. The
first Bose-Einstein condensate, which is the name given to the
phenomenon where a whole gas of atoms is in such a state that
it is one entity, was realized in 1995 by Eric Cornell and Carl
Wieman. They made use of an isotope of the atom rubidium,
and needed to slow down the motion of the atoms in the gas by
cooling it to 1.7 × 10−7 kelvin for the de Broglie waves of dif-
ferent atoms to start overlapping and merging into one quantum
wave for the whole gas (Anderson et al., 1995). They received the
Nobel Prize in Physics in 2001, together with Wolfgang Ketterle
at MIT, for this achievement, which climaxed a 15-year search
by physicists worldwide for a realization of such a Bose-Einstein
condensate.
Many years before the realization of this genuine macroscopic
quantum state of matter called the Bose-Einstein condensate, a
phenomenon called superfluidity had been experimentally identi-
fied for liquids composed of bosonic atoms, and more specifically
for a liquid of Helium-4. Indeed, when Helium-4 is cooled down
to below about 2.2 kelvin, it starts behaving weirdly. It passes
through narrow tubes seemingly without any friction, and climbs
up walls overflowing its container. Although early observations
of odd behavior had been recorded, it was only a long time
after Heike Kamerlingh Onnes first liquefied helium in 1908 that
its superfluidity was fully discovered, in 1938, by Pyotr Kapitsa
in Moscow, and independently by John F. Allen and Donald
Misener at the University of Toronto (Allen and Misener, 1938;
Kapitza, 1938). However, it was to take quite some years before
Fritz London put forward the hypothesis—which at the time
was still considered highly speculative—that superfluidity was a
phenomenon due to Bose-Einstein condensation. Laszlo Tisza
worked out a two-fluid model for liquid helium elaborating on
London’s hypothesis (London, 1938; Tisza, 1938).
A much more complicated phenomenon, superconductivity,
was observed as a consequence of the cooling techniques devel-
oped by Heike Kamerlingh Onnes, the same as those that allowed
him to produce liquid Helium. When he studied the resistance
of solid mercury at such low temperatures, he found this resis-
tance to be almost inexistent. In later years, this extreme form
of conductivity was to be identified in many other materials at
very low temperatures, but remained unexplained, despite major
efforts to understand the phenomenon. The resistance being zero
is demonstrated by the fact that currents can be sustained in
superconducting rings for many years with no measurable reduc-
tion, while an induced current in an ordinary metal ring would
decay rapidly because of the dissipation through ordinary resis-
tance. An important step toward a deeper understanding was
taken when in 1933Walther Meissner and Robert Ochsenfeld dis-
covered that superconductors expel magnetic fields in an extreme
way, a phenomenon which has come to be called the Meissner
effect (Meissner and Ochsenfeld, 1933). Several years later, Fritz
and Heinz London showed that the Meissner effect is a conse-
quence of the minimization of the electromagnetic free energy
carried by a superconducting current, and they developed the
first phenomenological theory for superconductivity (London
and London, 1935). A more powerful, but still phenomenological
theory was developed in 1950 by Ginzburg and Landau (1950). It
was not until 1957, however, that amicroscopical theory emerged,
when John Bardeen, LeonNeil Cooper and John Robert Schrieffer
explained superconductivity due to Bose-Einstein condensation,
as a consequence of an effect of superfluidity of electron pairs
bound in a very specific way, namely such that the pair is a
boson (Bardeen et al., 1957). These pairs, now commonly referred
to as ‘cooper pairs’, interact quantum mechanically by means of
phonons (Cooper, 1956). What is mind-boggling, is that the elec-
trons in a cooper pair are usually far apart from each other, at
distances greater than the average distance between electrons, and
remain bound to behave together as a boson bymeans of an inter-
action with the crystal lattice of the conductor through phonons,
leading to the effect of superconductivity. The proposed mecha-
nism, yielding an explanation for the superconductivity in cold
conductors, rests on firm grounds, theoretically as well as experi-
mentally, since for instance the superfluidity of Helium-3, reached
only at temperatures much lower than that at which the super-
fluidity of Helium-4 appears, has now also been explained by
cooper-pairing of the atoms of Helium-3 themselves into bosons
as pairs, although each of them is a fermion.
In short, the purpose of the above digression was to explain
some of the details of the two macroscopic quantum phenom-
ena called superfluidity and superconductivity, both due to their
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being a realization of a Bose-Einstein condensate, i.e., to a specific
type of entity behaving as a boson in its lowest-energy state, and
hence fusing all previously separated entities into one whole. We
have now come to the main point to be made for the purpose of
the present article. This macroscopic quantum behavior is cru-
cially dependent on the spin of the considered entity. However,
the spin is not a property that can be fit well into the wave-particle
explanation, it is neither a wave nor a particle, and it is described
by a vector in a finite dimensional complex Hilbert space. In the
next section, we will analyze some of the founding steps of quan-
tum physics itself to see why it is important to pay attention to the
fact that the spin is such a special property.
3. QUANTUM AXIOMATICS AND SEPARATION
Quantum theory arrived in two quite distinct ways. The first
was by means of the matrix mechanics of Werner Heisenberg,
elaborating further the approach by Max Planck and Niels Bohr
with respect to the notion of quantization, and the model-
ing of the atom (Planck, 1901; Heisenberg, 1925; Bohr, 1928).
The second way was as a consequence of the wave mechan-
ics of Erwin Schrödinger, elaborating on the work of Albert
Einstein and Louis de Broglie with respect to particle-waves
and matter waves (Einstein, 1905; de Broglie, 1923, 1928;
Schrödinger, 1926a). Schrödinger and later, more systemati-
cally, John von Neumann, showed that matrix mechanics and
wave mechanics are equivalent as physical theories (Schrödinger,
1926b; von Neumann, 1932). From a mathematical perspec-
tive, it can be proven that the version of quantum mechanics
known as matrix mechanics is equivalent to von Neumann’s
linear algebra and complex Hilbert space quantum mechan-
ics, when the Hilbert space is taken to be l2, the set of all
sequences (z1, z2, . . . , zj, . . . ) of complex numbers zj such that
the series of the square of their absolute values converges, i.e.,
limn →∞
∑n
j= 1 |zj|2 < ∞. Matrices are then linear functions on
such sequences, and indeed, Heisenberg needed ‘infinite matri-
ces’ for his matrix mechanics. On the other hand, the wave-
mechanics version of quantum theory is equivalent to von
Neumann’s linear algebra and complex Hilbert space, when the
Hilbert space is taken to be L2(R3n), the set of all square inte-
grable complex functions of 3n real variables for n quantum
particles. These functions are the so-called Schrödinger wave
functions.
The fact that quantum theory appeared in two quite different
versions which showed to be equivalent contains an important
message. It means that we have to be very careful when deriv-
ing possible physical images from one or both of these versions,
because they are mainly representations of a general theory of lin-
ear algebra and complex Hilbert space, which from now on we
will call standard quantum theory. The danger of putting for-
ward a physical image that is based only on the specific form
of a representation and that hence might not have a profound
significance is primarily present for wave mechanics, being devel-
oped from the start with such a specific physical image in mind,
namely that of a ‘wave’. And indeed, throughout the years the
notion of wave has been dominant in ‘imagining what a quantum
entity is’. Matrix mechanics—or more in general, the linear alge-
bra aspects of standard quantum theory, since a matrix or a linear
function does not produce a straightforward image—continued
to be mainly considered as a mathematical apparatus. If we know
the profoundmathematical equivalence of both theories, and also
the importance of spin, which has no associated ‘wave image’,
since its states are vectors in a finite dimensional Hilbert space,
there are strong reasons to doubt the validity of the ‘wave image’
in our attempt to grasp the physical aspects of a quantum entity.
There is indeed the—not to be neglected—chance that the promi-
nence of the wave image in quantum interpretations is only more
or less coincidental, because it appears in one specific realization
of Hilbert space, namely L2(R3n). The more so if we remember,
as explained in Section 2, that spin is at the origin of manifestly
different types of quantum behavior, Bose-Einstein statistics or
Fermi-Dirac statistics, even on the level where quantum prop-
erties show macroscopically, such as in lasers and Bose-Einstein
condensates. So perhaps the only logical conclusion we should
allow to be drawn until further relevant information is avail-
able is that quantum entities are ‘neither particles nor waves’,
rather than to imagine them as particle-waves. Moreover, in the
decades following the early development of quantum theory, var-
ious axiomatic and operationally founded quantum formalisms
were worked out, all of them more general than the formal-
ism of standard quantum theory of linear algebra and complex
Hilbert space (Mackey, 1963; Jauch, 1968; Piron, 1976, 1989,
1990; Aerts, 1982a, 1983a,b; Ludwig, 1983; Foulis, 1999). This
means that even more mathematically inspired notions, such as
‘the superposition principle’, which find its origin in the linearity
of standard quantum theory in Hilbert space, should be looked
upon with care in case one wants to use them as a foundation
for the interpretation of quantum theory, because indeed, these
operational axiomatic quantum theories are not a priori linear
theories.
In this respect, we specifically want to put forward and ana-
lyze a result we obtained ourselves quite some time ago when
investigating the situation of ‘separated physical entities’ within
such a generalized axiomatic and operational quantum theory,
because of its relevance for the main question considered in the
present article. The generalized axiomatic operational quantum
formalism in which we performed this investigation on separated
physical entities is the one currently referred to as the Geneva-
Brussels School on quantum theory (Piron, 1964, 1976, 1989,
1990; Aerts, 1982a, 1983a,b, 1986, 1999a,b, 2009c; Cattaneo and
Nistico, 1991, 1993; Aerts et al., 1999; Aerts and Van Steirteghem,
2000; Coeck et al., 2000; Smets, 2003; Engesser et al., 2007; Sassoli
de Bianchi, 2010, 2011, 2013).
The Geneva-Brussels School quantum theory is an axiomatic
operational generalization of standard quantum theory. It is oper-
ational because it attempts to introduce mathematical notions,
and also as many axioms as possible, in such a way that they have
a clear physical meaning. For the purpose of this article, it is by
no means necessary to explain this theory, because I will use it
only to formulate the result about separated entities relevant to
the subject we are concerned with. Let me first express this result
by means of the following simple statement.
Statement A: Standard quantum theory is incomplete in the
sense that it cannot describe the compound entity consisting of two
separated subentities.
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To explain the result expressed in statement A in a way that
its meaning becomes clear, I will introduce some notions—more
specifically the names of axioms—from the Geneva-Brussels
School quantum theory, and also sketch some of the history of
how I arrived at proving this result. There is no need at all to
know what these notions/names mean, because the result about
separated entities expressed in statement A can be formulated
completely independently of their content. After analyzing its
meaning, I will give an example to illustrate this result. The
Geneva-Brussels School quantum theory reduces to standard
quantum theory if five axioms are satisfied, to wit (1) ‘com-
pleteness’, (2) ‘orthocomplementation’, (3) ‘atomicity’, (4) ‘weak
modularity’, and (5) ‘the covering law’. It was in fact Constantin
Piron who in 1964 proved that these five axioms led to stan-
dard quantum theory by means of a now famous representation
theorem in axiomatic quantum theory (Piron, 1964, 1976). The
motivation to investigate the situation of ‘separated entities’ goes
back to a situation which Ingrid Daubechies and myself analyzed
at the end of the 1970ies, namely the description of compound
entities within the operational axiomatic Geneva-Brussels School
quantum theory. In those days, the well-known tensor product
procedure used in standard quantum theory for the description of
compound quantum entities had not yet been investigated at the
operational axiomatic level. At the time, we had in mind to search
for criteria that would give rise to the tensor product procedure
in case of standard quantum theory interpreted within the opera-
tional axiomatics of the Geneva-Brussels School quantum theory,
and the first investigations seemed promising in this respect
(Aerts and Daubechies, 1978). Because of the powerful opera-
tional aspects of the Geneva-Brussels quantum theory, parallel
to the mathematical aspects explored in Aerts and Daubechies
(1978), I decided to construct explicitly the model of the most
simple of all operational situations, namely the situation of ‘two
separated physical entities’. A very surprising and also completely
unexpected result followed because, when constructing literally
by hand the model of the compound of two separated entities, I
could prove that this model would never satisfy axioms 4 and 5,
called ‘weak modularity’ and ‘the covering law’, whenever the two
subentities were genuine quantum entities, e.g., described well by
standard quantum theory. When I found this result I was work-
ing in Geneva on my PhD under guidance of Constantin Piron,
and I remember that the whole group in Geneva was in a state of
disbelief about it, because it implied, if correct, that a structural
shortcoming of standard quantum theory had been identified on
its core axiomatic nature, ‘its incapacity to model separated enti-
ties’. It became the cornerstone of my PhD, which I defended in
1981 (Aerts, 1982a, 1983a,b). Certainly the failure of axiom 5,
the covering law, was shocking, since it is an axiom equivalent
to the linearity, i.e., the vector space structure, of the set of states
of the considered entity. So, I had proven that the set of states
of the compound entity of two separated quantum entities could
not be linear, hence could not be a vector space. Obviously, if one
knows howmuch standard quantum theory is founded on the lin-
earity of the considered mathematical structure, e.g., the Hilbert
space of the set of states, when this linearity is no longer satisfied,
all of standard quantum theory breaks down. For example, the
superposition principle will no longer be a principle valid for all
states.
In the years that followed, I understood that my result was
in concordance with findings related to the violation of Bell’s
inequalities, which was then becoming a focus of attention in the
foundation of quantum physics research. My analysis was a con-
structive one, however, in the sense that I explicitly constructed
the model for two separated physical entities, and identified the
aspects of that model that made it impossible to be realized
within a standard quantum theory. My result did not rely on an
argumentation ‘ex absurdum’, which was, for example, the argu-
mentation contained in the original Einstein Poldolsky Rosen
paper (Einstein et al., 1935). As a consequence, I was able to
analyze the EPR paradox situation as one that indeed proves stan-
dard quantum theory to be not complete, but in the sense that it
cannot describe separated quantum entities. This means that the
EPR proof contained in Einstein et al. (1935) is correct, but it is
a proof ‘ex absurdum’, consisting in finding a logical contradic-
tion, i.e., ‘if quantum theory is complete, then it is not complete’.
From this of course follows that ‘it is not complete’, but this con-
sequence is only the result of ‘the hypothesis of completeness
leading to a contradiction’. Since my proof of the incompleteness
was constructive, I could indicate the origin of this incomplete-
ness, and this was ‘not’, like EPR inferred from their finding of
a contradiction, the necessity of the existence of ‘hidden vari-
ables’, but its failure to model separation. The constructive nature
of my analysis of the situation even allowed me to operationally
identify the missing elements of reality, and thus indicate the
incompleteness operationally and directly (Aerts, 1984). I remem-
ber meeting Alain Aspect—the physicist performing the crucial
experiments in 1982 about the violation of Bell’s inequality with
entangled photons (Aspect et al., 1981, 1982)—on several occa-
sions and asking him: “But would you still violate Bell’s inequality
and identify entanglement in case you made an effort to separate
the quantum entities, rather than make every effort to not sepa-
rate them, as you are doing now?”. “Of course not”, he answered,
“but why would one want to try this?” Naturally, because of my
constructive approach to investigating the description of sepa-
rated physical entities, this question had become relevant and
even crucial tome. I had approached the situation from the begin-
ning from the opposite direction than most, if not all, physicists
involved in this problem, which is the reason why the relevance
of this question remained unnoticed by the others. My analysis
showed that separated entities could not be described by stan-
dard quantum theory, even if no attempt was made to keep them
entangled, while all experiments conducted with respect to EPR
started from a different approach, their question being ‘how far
can we set detectors apart in space, such that entanglement is still
registered, while we make every effort to keep this entanglement
intact’. They were interested in testing ‘how far the quantum effect
of entanglement reaches, when it is attempted to keep it intact as
much as possible’, whereas I had become intrigued by the find-
ing that ‘in whatever state of separation two quantum entities
are prepared, a standard quantum theoretic description of their
compound entity is not possible, as such a description will always
introduce entanglement’.
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One of the reasons why it is difficult to identify within standard
quantum theory itself the result I obtained within the Geneva-
Brussels School quantum theory, and the ensuinging inability to
model separated quantum entities for standard quantum the-
ory, is that this inability does not appear obviously at the level
of the set of states. Indeed, one may wonder, ‘Why not just use
product states in the tensor product Hilbert space model for
the compound entity consisting of separated quantum entities
to describe this compound entity consisting of separated quan-
tum entities?’. Although, since the fifth axiom, the convering law,
being equivalent to linearity, cannot be satisfied in the case of sep-
arated entities—this is what I proved in Aerts (1982a, 1983a,b)
–, and hence the set of states ‘cannot’ be a vector space for the
compound entity consisting of two separated quantum entities,
there are enough states in the tensor product, namely exactly the
set of product states, to cope with each situation of such com-
pound of two separated quantum entities. However, this set of
product states in the tensor product does not cope correctly with
other fundamental aspects of the situation, even if all entangled
states, being the linear superpositions of these product states, are
left out of the description. This can be seen straightforwardly
only on the level of the observables and/or of the dynamical
evolutions. We will show this by looking at a concrete example
of the compound entity of two separated entities by focusing
on the question, ‘What are the possible evolutions that can be
described within such a tensor product standard quantum theory
description’. Let us remark that ‘evolutions’, in the case of stan-
dard quantum theory, are described by unitary transformations of
the Hilbert space—the so-called Schrödinger equation stands for
such unitary evolutions. More concretely, if H is the Hamiltonian
of the entity, then the Schrödinger equation expressed in unitary
evolution form is
ψ(t) = ei h2π Htψ(0) (2)
whereψ(t) is the wave function at time t, as a vector of the Hilbert
space of states. There are enough states in the tensor product,
namely the set of product states, but there are not enough evo-
lutions, that is where standard quantum theory explicitly fails to
describe the compound of two separated quantum entities. To
illustrate this, I will first refer to a theorem that can easily be
proven within standard quantum theory, which is the following.
If one considers the tensor product description of the compound
entity consisting of two quantum entities, then a unitary transfor-
mation U(1, 2) of the compound entity that conserves product
states—hence maps product states onto product states – is always
of the form U(1) ⊗ U(2), the tensor product of a unitary trans-
formation of the first entity with a unitary transformation of the
second entity. So, if one attempts to describe separated entities
within the tensor product, only tensor products of evolutions
of both entities apart keep them separated. Whenever an evo-
lution is not such a tensor product, product states will go to
entangled states as a consequence of such an evolution. Next to
this theorem, there is a point to be clarified, namely that ‘sepa-
rated’ does not mean ‘without possible interaction’—entities in
the classical world indeed remain separated if they only inter-
act dynamically, because indeed, dynamical interaction does not
destroy the product states. In classical physics, most interact-
ing entities are separated but dynamically interacting. This is
the meaning of ‘separated’ that I used in my theorem (Aerts,
1982a, 1983a,b). This means that statement A can be refined as,
‘The compound entity of separated quantum entities that inter-
act dynamically cannot be modeled in standard quantum theory’.
If we now consider any type of dynamical interaction between
two quantum entities, we can see that this interaction will be
expressed in a Hamiltonian H(1, 2) of the compound entity,
which is not a simple sum of two Hamiltonians H(1) and H(2)
of each of the subentities apart, whenever the interaction is non-
trivial. This means that the unitary transformation generated by
this Hamiltonian, i.e., ei
h
2π H(1, 2)t , not being a product of two uni-
tary transformations, each of one of the subentities—this would
only be the case if H(1, 2) is a sum of two Hamiltononians, of
which each is the Hamiltonian of one of the subentities, meaning
that there is no dynamical interaction between the subentities—
will not work within the set of product states. Or, more concretely,
it will change any product state right away into an entangled state.
Let us make it even more concrete. Suppose two neutrons are
placed in faraway spots in completely empty space, which means
that only gravitational interaction exists between them. This grav-
itational interaction expressed in an interaction Hamiltonian will
give rise to an evolution of the compound entity of these two
neutrons that leads them right away into entangled states. Both
neutrons rotating around a common center of mass, as is the case
with macroscopic material objects that dynamically interact only
through gravity, is hence not possible within a standard quantum
theoretic description in Hilbert space. Of course, one possibility is
that indeed no such two neutrons in a gravitational Kepler move-
ment exist in our reality, and that the existence of such a Kepler
movement of two macroscopic material entities is a specificity of
their being macroscopic. In this respect, I want to bring up a sub-
tlety of the theorem that I proved for my PhD thesis, namely that
‘only in the case both subentities are quantum entities, techni-
cally meaning that at least one superposition state exists for each
of the subentities, can the compound of these entities not be a
compound of separated entities interacting dynamically’. It is suf-
ficient that one of the two entities is classical—which technically
means that no superposition states exist for any of the states—
for the investigation I made to allow the description of separated
subentities.
This means that from a logical point of view, my finding leaves
open the following two possibilities. Statement A: Standard quan-
tum theory is incomplete, in the sense that it cannot describe the
compound entity consisting of two separated subentities. Statement
B: Such a compound entity does not exist or, in other words,
whenever two quantum entities exist, their compound entity is not
separated.
Alain Aspect’s experiments (Aspect et al., 1981, 1982) con-
ducted around the same time when I defended my PhD, and also
all later experiments aiming to find quantum effect on ever wider
macroscopic scales, of which we gave an overview and analysis in
this article (Rauch, 1975, 2000; Aspect et al., 1981, 1982; Tittel
et al., 1998; Weish et al., 1998; Arndt et al., 1999; Aspelmeyer
et al., 2003; Salart et al., 2008; Gerlich et al., 2011; Bruno et al.,
2013), suggest that statement B is the correct conclusion to be
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drawn. On the other hand, we live surrounded by macroscopic
entities such as tables, chairs, cars, etc... that do not show quan-
tum effects of any kind, which would indicate that statement A
is to be considered correct. In the next section, we will argue
that the situation is more complicated than that, as well as ana-
lyze how the experimental attitude of attempting to find quantum
effects with all means possible—the root of my question to Alain
Aspect in 1981—and adding to this our insights about the very
nature of quantum effects themselves, is at the source of a subtle
confusion that is not at all understood. This analysis will guide
us in proposing our view on the main question of this article,
i.e., ‘why macroscopic entities present themselves to us the way
they do’.
4. QUANTUM AND COGNITION, MEANING AND MATTER
Around the turn of the century, and more intensively so during
the first decade of the 21st century, quantum theory, as a for-
malism, has been used with growing success to model situations
in human cognition, so that nowadays ‘quantum cognition’ is
emerging as a flourishing domain of research (Aerts and Aerts,
1995; Aerts et al., 2000, 2011, 2013a,b; Gabora and Aerts, 2002;
Aerts and Gabora, 2005a,b; Bruza et al., 2007, 2008, 2009; Aerts,
2009b; Pothos and Busemeyer, 2009, 2013; Khrennikov, 2010;
Aerts and Sozzo, 2011; Busemeyer et al., 2011, 2012; Song et al.,
2011; Busemeyer and Bruza, 2012; Wang et al., 2013; Sozzo,
2014). Our research group in Brussels at the Center Leo Apostel
has played an important role in the initiation (Aerts and Aerts,
1995; Aerts et al., 2000; Gabora and Aerts, 2002; Aerts and
Gabora, 2005a,b) and further development (Aerts, 2009b; Aerts
and Sozzo, 2011; Aerts et al., 2011, 2013a,b; Sozzo, 2014) of this
new domain of research called ‘quantum cognition’.
As for my own role in the development of quantum cogni-
tion, at least some of the seeds were sown toward the end of the
1970ies when I was reflecting about the result explained in Section
3, i.e., the inability of standard quantum theory to describe sep-
arated entities, and also confronting this result with the factual
situation of being surrounded by separated entities in our every-
day macroscopic world. My first insight was that non-separated
entities could be easily realized as well in the macro world, for
example, by connecting vessels of water, which even lead to a
violation of Bell’s inequalities (Aerts, 1982b). When I analyzed
this violation of Bell’s inequalities by the vessels of water in
detail, it became clear that quantum probabilities and their non-
Kolmogorovian structure could be explained from the presence of
‘hiddenmeasurements’ or, in other words, the presence of ‘fluctu-
ations in—or a lack of knowledge about—the interaction between
themeasurement apparatus and the entity to bemeasured’ (Aerts,
1986). Indeed, it was possible to show that such a lack of knowl-
edge about the interaction between the measurement and the
entity to be measured was part of the mechanism provoking the
violation of Bell’s inequalities in the vessels of water situation,
and also in subsequent elaborations producing exactly the same
numerical violation as the quantum one (Aerts, 1991). Once it
was clearly understood how the quantum probability structure
of the statistics of collected data arose—by the presence of a lack
of knowledge about the interaction between the measurement
apparatus and the entity to be measured—this led more or less
naturally to the idea that similar situations—characterized by the
presence of a similar lack of knowledge—would also appear in
typical measurement situations in research in the human sciences,
and more specifically in cognitive science. This insight was at the
origin of the quantum probability model we worked out for the
situation encountered in an opinion poll (Aerts and Aerts, 1995).
In the same period I prepared an online lecture together with
Liane Gabora, which stimulated me to work out a violation of
Bell’s inequalities in cognition, along the line of the vessels of
water violation, but this time considering the ‘change of opin-
ion in a person’s mind’ as a quantum collapse event (Aerts et al.,
2000). It was also during this ongoing collaboration that Liane
Gabora suggested looking at the guppy effect, an experimen-
tally tested anomaly in concept combination, and investigating
whether quantum theory could deliver a modeling of this effect.
It was the start of our in-depth investigation of concepts and
their combinations, which yielded not only our SCOP theory
(Gabora and Aerts, 2002; Aerts and Gabora, 2005a,b), but also
the modeling of the very revealing data of James Hampton on the
conjunction and the disjunction of concepts (Hampton, 1988a,b),
as well as the development of our Fock space model (Aerts,
2009b), and further analysis and applications (Aerts and Sozzo,
2011; Aerts et al., 2013a,b; Sozzo, 2014).
In parallel with these investigations, I was hatching a new idea
but it was still very premature and far too speculative to justify
serious investigation. However, it kept popping up, and many
times I found myself reflecting about it. The basis of the new
idea was very simple, and can be expressed as follows: “If quan-
tum theory is so successful in modeling aspects of cognition, and
more specifically, also how the dynamics of concepts and their
combinations work, could it not be that quantum particles are
not objects, but entities having mainly a conceptual nature?” The
additional thought naturally ensuing would be, “And would this
perhaps also account for their highly strange behavior?” I have
worked on this idea for several years now—albeit in parallel with
a large number of other themes of research—and I must admit
that my investigations have considerably strengthened my belief
that many aspects of it must be true, which made me decide to
develop it into a new and complete interpretation of quantum
theory (Aerts, 2009a, 2010a,b, 2013). It also dawned upon me
that in fact it is even the unique quantum interpretation which
also contains an explanation for some of the major unexplained
phenomena of quantum physics. Before I will discuss some of
these, let me give a more detailed account of this new quantum
interpretation.
When we say that the new interpretation assumes that quan-
tum particles are ‘conceptual entities’ rather than objects, we do
not mean this in a vague or merely philosophical way. The idea
is that quantum particles are ‘not’ what they are often imag-
ined to be, namely ‘very complex objects flying between pieces of
matter, by which they can be absorbed, and then live in bound
states inside, and also radiated out again’, but they are some-
thing much more deeply different still from a classical particle,
namely ‘conceptual entities mediating between such pieces of
matter, these forming a type of memory structure for them’. A
fundamental aspect of this new interpretation is therefore that we
regard the dynamics on the level of the micro-world, as a dual
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type of dynamics, with some of its entities mediating—these are
the bosons—, and thus carrying meaning, between other enti-
ties that form memory structures—these are the pieces of matter,
formed of fermions. The overall dynamics incorporates the co-
evolution of these two types of entities, carried by a process of
meaning exchange. Let us remark that, according to this new
interpretation, ‘quantum entities are conceptual with respect to
their own memory structures, which are pieces of matter’. This
means that they are ‘not’ concepts interacting directly with the
human mind and that the human mind here does not serve as
a memory structure for them. Such a direct dynamical interac-
tion with the human mind, in which the human mind serves as
a memory structure, exists only for human concepts themselves.
The only direct way in which the conceptual nature of quantum
entities comes about is through their dynamical interaction with
pieces of matter, which act as their memory structures. In other
words, the relation of human mind vs. human concepts, and the
relation of pieces of matter vs. quantum entities can be said to
be analogies taking place in different realms of reality. Of course,
since human experiments with these quantum entities necessar-
ily involve the use of measurement apparatuses, which are pieces
of matter by definition, indirectly, through the interface of these
measurement apparatuses, we, with our human minds, are con-
fronted with the quantum entities behaving as conceptual entities
in all our experiments with them. But our confrontation with
their conceptual nature is only indirect, because of the unavoid-
able interfaces in the form of measurement apparatuses. Hence,
the success of the quantum formalism as a mathematical formal-
ism, in its description of the microworld, and its modeling of the
cognitive dynamics of concepts, would be due to the fact that both
realms, the micro-world where bosons mediate between pieces of
matter formed of fermions, and the world of human commu-
nication, where language is used to mediate between minds, are
realms of similar dynamics. For example, this new interpretation
allows understanding and explaining the Heisenberg uncertainty
principle as being due to the tradeoff between a concept being
more abstract or more concrete (see Aerts, 2009a, Section 4.1).
Let us be somewhat more specific. In Aerts and Gabora (2005a,b),
we introduced the notion of ‘state of a human concept’, at that
moment mainly to apply the mathematical quantum-like formal-
ism that we developed to model human concepts and how they
combine. Suppose we consider the human concept Fruits and take
one of various experimentally measurable observables introduced
by psychologists studying concepts, namely typicality. An exper-
iment could then consist in listing different possible properties
of the concept Fruits, and measuring experimentally the typicali-
ties of these properties. One such property could be Can be Used
to Prepare a Drink, and its typicality can be measured by asking
test subjects to estimate it on a Likert scale, and calculating the
average outcome of these estimates. Suppose we now consider
the variant Juicy Fruits and again measure the typicality of the
property Can be Used to Prepare a Drink. Obviously, the typical-
ity value will increase. So Juicy combined with Fruits has changed
the value of a measurable observable, such as typicality, and one
can easily imagine that the measurable values of other observ-
ables will be influenced too. A similar behavior with respect to
measurable observables for physical objects is expressed in physics
by the notion of ‘state’, and that is also how we introduced this
notion for a concept (Aerts and Gabora, 2005a,b). An exemplar of
a concept can then be considered to be also a state of this concept.
Indeed Orange, as an exemplar of Fruits, will obviously increase
substantially the measurable observable ‘typicality of a property’
in the case of the property Can be Used to Prepare a Drink. Each
concept can then be in states that are more abstract and states
that are more concrete. Orange is a more concrete state of the
concept Fruits than Juicy Fruits, and both are states that are more
concrete than the most abstract state Fruits itself. There are two
lines that run between ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ for human con-
cepts. The first line runs from the most abstract, i.e., Thing, to the
most concrete, i.e., an instantiation of a concept—an instantia-
tion is what psychologists refer to as the realization of a concept in
time, and sometimes also in space, if the instantiation is an object.
The second line runs from the bare form of the concept, such as
Fruits, to a qualified form, where the concept appears within a
very specific meaning context, e.g., a website on the World-Wide
Web. The existence of these two non-coinciding lines for human
language is interesting enough, but mainly so for historical rea-
sons, i.e., because of the importance that physical objects in the
customary human environment have played in the formation of
human language. The most relevant of both lines to the compar-
ison we are making here is the second, where concepts collapsed
inside the meaning context of a text, e.g., a website, attaining their
most concrete state. Indeed, it is this line running from ‘abstract’
to ‘concrete’ that we compare with the states of quantum parti-
cles running from ‘delocalized’ to ‘localized’. However, both lines
play a role in how the human mind copes with concepts, with
their combinations, and with abstract and concrete degrees. For
example, the logical connective ‘or’, put in between two human
concepts, e.g., Fruits and Vegetables, to form the concept Fruits
Or Vegetables, produces a more abstract state for both concepts,
due to the meaning of ‘or’ in human language. We do not find
this abstraction easily represented along the second line, com-
binations of three concepts, such as Fruits Or Vegetables, occur
in texts just as combinations of three words. With regard to the
above example of the World-WideWeb, this means that text anal-
ysis will need to take into account the first line—from abstract
to concrete—as well. This is one of the major unsolved prob-
lems of semantic space theories and related domains of research,
including natural language processing and information retrieval,
which is why our approach is of value for the problems encoun-
tered in these domains (Aerts and Czachor, 2004; Van Rijsbergen,
2004; Widdows, 2006). In many instances we use the World-Wide
Web as the entity playing for the human conceptual realm the
role that space-filled-with-pieces-of-matter plays for the micro-
physical realm. When we do so, we use the analogy between the
two realms by focusing on the second line from ‘abstract to con-
crete’ in the human conceptual realm. However, we should bear
in mind also to pay attention to the first line from ‘abstract to
concrete’ for being a contributing factor to the meaning carried
in texts on the World-Wide Web. So, also in our examples, we are
confronted with this difficulty of expressing meaning in language,
which is the core difficulty that semantic space theories are con-
fronted with. To be more specific, if a concept from the human
conceptual realm, for example the concept Animal, is maximally
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abstract, it will appear in greatly varying states in many webpages,
i.e., it will be strongly delocalized on theWorld-WideWeb. On the
other hand, if we consider a very concrete concept or combination
of concepts—the most concrete we can now imagine being the
total content of a document on the World-Wide Web—then this
‘total’ content will be present only in this particular document,
i.e., it will be very localized. In other words, in this new interpre-
tation, the delocalization of a quantum entity is interpreted in a
similar way, not as a spreading out over space, but as an abstrac-
tion of all the parts of space-filled-with-pieces-of-matter where
it is not localized. This would also explain why the Heisenberg
uncertainty is ontological, and not due to a lack of experimental
preciseness. If a quantum particle is a conceptual entity mediat-
ing between pieces of matter, it cannot be very abstract and very
concrete at once, which means the tradeoff between abstract and
concrete is ontological, because of the ontological nature of the
quantum entity being conceptual. The new interpretation like-
wise enables us to understand and explain the weird behavior
of quantum entities related to identity. If we consider the con-
cept Eleven Animals on its abstract level, all the element animals
are identical but ontologically so, because the ontology is concep-
tual if the entities considered are conceptual. This is exactly how
identical quantum entities appear, in theory as well as in experi-
ment. In Section 4.3 of Aerts (2009a) we analyzed how ‘identity’
behaves for human concepts, more specifically for the concept
Eleven Animals, its possible states being combinations of n Cats
and 11 − n Dogs for n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 10, 11}, and we showed, by
comparing the numbers of webpages on the World-Wide Web
and the relative frequency of appearance of the different combi-
nations, that a Bose-Einstein statistics emerges, exactly like it does
for bosonic quantum entities. We also identified the presence of
entanglement for human concept combinations in Section 2 of
Aerts (2009a), notably showing the violation of Bell’s inequal-
ity, and, using the data from Hampton (1988a,b), in Section 3
of Aerts (2009a), we analyzed how interference of combinations
of human concepts appears. See for example Figure 4 of Aerts
(2009a) and its analysis for a graphical representation of the inter-
ference between the two concepts Fruits andVegetables, within the
combination Fruits or Vegetables.
We have now gathered all the elements that we need to explain
‘Why customary macroscopic entities appear to us humans as
they do, i.e., as bounded entities occupying space and persist-
ing through time’. We will give a more elaborate answer below
but in summary we could say that ‘we humans perceive with our
senses and mind in a manner unlike that of measuring appara-
tuses such as those used by physicists in laboratory experiments to
detect quantum effects’. In other words, ‘the interaction between a
human mind, aided by the human eye, and a macroscopic entity,
i.e., the entity we identify as a customary macroscopic object,
should not be interpreted as belonging to the same category of
interactions as those between a customary measurement appara-
tus used to detect quantum effects and such a macroscopic entity’.
They are interactions of a fundamentally different nature. To state
it more sharply, for the sake of clarity, we could say that ‘the inter-
action of a human mind, through the human senses of vision and
touch—we will analyze below why smell, taste and hearing are
different—with a customary macroscopic entity is an interaction
‘not’ within its own realm of conceptuality’, it is in some sense
an interaction ‘trying to bridge two realms of conceptuality’, the
first realm being where ‘micro-quantum entities interact concep-
tually with pieces of matter’, and the second realm being ‘where
human minds interact conceptually with memory structures—
possibly other humanminds, or pieces of text, or theWorld-Wide
Web’. However, in ‘seeing or touching a macroscopic custom-
ary entity’, the human eye, the human fingers and other parts of
the body do not interact within one of these conceptual realms.
Seeing and touching are in some sense much more primitive
types of interaction than those within the two realms mentioned
before, namely realm number one, the micro-quantum realm,
‘the interaction of bosons with pieces of matter’, and realm num-
ber two, the human conceptual realm, ‘the interaction of words
with human memories’. We will not provide a detailed analy-
sis of seeing and touching since this would take us beyond the
scope of this article. Instead, we will briefly explain what we mean
here.
Seeing takes place by means of light, but mainly by means of
a complex interpretation in the visual cortex of the pattern of
light falling onto the retina of the eye. Nothing of the quantum
nature of light plays any role in this mechanism, on the contrary,
the eye has evolved biologically into an organ that can be ade-
quately explained by comparing it to a camera obscura, which
is the mechanical environment where the geometrical theory of
light fares well, while the visual cortex evolved biologically as well
to create a photographic imaging of this pattern on the retina
as faithfully as possible. The geometric model for the behav-
ior of light is as far from the quantum behavior of light as we
can imagine. Touching is a way of interacting that is profoundly
micro-quantum by nature, but only in accordance with one spe-
cific quantum rule, namely Pauli’s exclusion principle. If we touch
a customary macroscopic entity, we try to put our finger, which
is also a macroscopic material entity, in the same place as the
touched entity. Pauli’s exclusion principle forbids this to hap-
pen. However, it is essential that both, the customarymacroscopic
entity and our finger, are composed of fermions, which are the
only micro-entities able to form stable pieces of matter (Dyson
and Lenard, 1967; Lenard and Dyson, 1968; Lieb, 1976, 1979;
Muthaporn and Manoukian, 2004). And the material entities
around us and also our finger indeed obey this exclusion prin-
ciple, for we cannot put them in the same state, being, in this
case, in the same place. But Pauli’s exclusion principle, although
a fundamental rule of quantum theory, is not linked to the typ-
ical quantum phenomena, such as interference or entanglement.
It is, in some sense, a very classical type of rule persisting in the
micro realm, excluding two fermions from being in the same state.
This means that our touching sense does not confront us with the
quantum nature of macroscopic customary entities either. Let us
also note that, if we put forward the question of ‘why custom-
ary macroscopic entities appear to us humans as they do, i.e., as
bounded entities occupying space and persisting through time’,
we are inclined to think of the two senses of ‘seeing’ and ‘touch-
ing’, or their prolongations. Indeed, if we were to make a movie
of such customary macroscopic entities, the movie would con-
firm our seeing them, since movie-making is a prolongation of
the human sense of seeing, at the same time pushing light into its
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geometrically idealized behavior. If we confront such customary
macroscopic entities with other such entities, for example by col-
lision, then this is a prolongation of our touching sense, and
again Pauli’s exclusion principle will determine what happens.
What about other human senses, such as smell, taste and hear-
ing? The sentence ‘why customary macroscopic entities appear to
us humans as they do, i.e., as bounded entities occupying space
and persisting through time’ would already appear quite differ-
ently if we perceived our surrounding reality mainly by smell.
To give one example, it would be very easy to create a situation
violating Bell’s inequalities—much like the situations we pro-
posed in discussing the vessels of water or a connected rod (Aerts,
1982b, 1991)—by considering odors that give rise to correlations
in smell. Obviously, we would perceive the world around as much
less of a world of clearly separated entities if smell was our main
sense. The same is true for taste and hearing. In this sense, it is not
a coincidence that what we have called the second realm of con-
ceptuality, the one of human communication, has first emerged
through the use of the sense of hearing, namely by means of
spoken language. The birth of written language was effectively a
major achievement in itself, because the fluidity of spoken lan-
guage needed to be pushed into the much crisper nature of vision.
In this sense, it is not a coincidence either that the invention of the
alphabet is seen as a major event in human culture, although even
today alphabets are not capable of rendering in a clear way most
dialect forms of spoken languages.
As we have seen above, we can explain why humans are not
confronted with quantum behavior through the senses of seeing
and touching, even though this behavior is profusely apparent
on the macro-level—light shining on the skin of our body does
react quantum mechanically with our skin, for example, but light
entering our eyes behaves along the classical geometric model.
This naturally leads to the question of ‘What ‘are’ these customary
macroscopic entities, are they quantum or are they not?’ This is a
question about the ontological status of customary macroscopic
entities. Let me go back to some of the quantum phenomena
that we described in some detail in the foregoing sections of the
present article and attempt to give a nuanced answer to this ques-
tion. I will also illustrate how, for this question, our new quantum
interpretation, and the comparison and analogy of the two realms
of conceptual interaction, themicro-realm, and the human realm,
can put forward a view that offers an explanation and that is com-
prehensible. Experiments that aim to detect quantum interference
of ever bigger molecules have proved successful (Arndt et al.,
1999; Gerlich et al., 2011). The currently most advanced exper-
iments with respect to this quantum phenomenon (Gerlich et al.,
2011) make use of organic molecules of up to 430 atoms, and a
maximum size of up to 60 angstrom, which is 60 × 10−10 meters,
and a de Broglie length of 1 picometer, which is 10−12 meters. To
get an idea of the relative sizes at play, we could scale them up
from angstrom to millimeter. This results in molecules the size of
a prune of about 6 centimeter. The de Broglie wavelength, sized
up accordingly, would become 1100 of a millimeter, which is very
small. This means that there are in fact no overlapping de Broglie
waves for the molecules in the detected interference. The slits in
the grating, hence the separation of the beam into two beamlets,
are two orders of magnitude bigger than the size of the molecules.
If we scale up the sizes again by the same factor, the two beamlets
become separated by 6m. So, what Gerlich et al. (2011) and his
team have done is delocalize a molecule—still according to the
scaled-up view—of the size of a prune over a distance of 6m.
To grasp how spectacular this is, let us restate in more
detail what such a delocalization actually is. It means that if we
attempted to detect the molecule in spot A, a spot inside one of
both beamlets, the probability of finding it in this spot A would
be equal to 1/2. The same holds for a spot B in the other beam-
let, while A and B are 6m apart. If we mention only this aspect
of delocalization, we can still propose a classical explanation for
this, imagining that the molecule just chooses one of the beamlets
at the point where the beam splits into two parts, i.e., long before
in space and time it reaches one of the spots A or B. But there
are other experiments that can be performed to demonstrate that
this cannot be the case, and that themolecule is in a state of super-
position between ‘being in A’ and ‘being in B’ at the moment it
passes where spots A and B are located. Some physicists express
this by stating that the molecule is in the two places at once, while
others say that the molecule is neither in A nor in B, considering
the superposition state as a new emergent state, not localized in
space, hence not spatial. As long as such experiments were done
with very small quantum entities, such as photons, electrons, or
neutrons, we could also still imagine the quantum entity as being
spread out, like a wave. But in the case of big entities with compli-
cated internal structures, such as the molecules consisting of 430
atoms referred to above, this is no longer possible. Indeed, what is
important to note in this respect, is that the internal structure of
the molecule is not affected at all by this superposing. Whenever
an attempt is made to detect the molecule, it is detected, unaf-
fected, and in its entirety. This means that this superposing effect
does not in any way affect the internal structure of the molecule, it
is an effect happening on the level of the ontology of themolecule,
on the level of ‘what the molecule is’.
With smaller quantum entities, delocalization of much greater
size has been realized. As early as in the 1970ies, Helmut Rauch
delocalized a neutron in a similar double-slit setup, over a dis-
tance that, if we scale up the neutron to the size of a prune,
would be equal to several thousand kilometers (Rauch, 1975,
2000). What is most relevant, however, and also crucial for the
central reflection of this discussion, is that Gerlich et al. (2011)
realize a delocalization which is without any doubt big enough—
also taken into account the size of the corresponding de Broglie
wavelength—to conclude that the same quantum phenomenon is
at play here as that observed on so many occasions with small and
more typical quantum entities, such as photons, electrons, or neu-
trons.We should add, however, that ‘the detection of the quantum
interference effect is only possible with a specific experimental
arrangement specially made for the detection of delocalization’,
namely the whole experimental setup of a double-slit for these
sizes of molecules. Does this mean that an adapted experimental
setup will enable us to put a chair or a table or any one of our cus-
tomary macroscopic entities into a state of superposition of two
widely separated places? It seems that this is indeed what these
experiments indicate. Of course, it might well be that this will not
be possible experimentally for many years to come, or indeed,
that interference for large entities such as chairs or tables will
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remain out of experimental reach (almost) forever. This, however,
does not change the fact that ‘in principle also chairs, tables, and
any customary macroscopic entity are ontologically of the same
nature as these huge organic molecules’. Is it possible to com-
prehend this? The following example serves to illustrate that our
new quantum interpretation puts forward a simple and plausible
explanation.
In Aerts (2009b), Section 3, we investigated in detail the
situation of the two concepts Fruits and Vegetables and their com-
bination Fruits or Vegetables, and showed how data collected in
Hampton (1988b) revealed the effect of interference. A graphi-
cal representation of the pattern of this interference is shown in
Figure 4 of Aerts (2009b). Of course, for two concepts such as
Fruits and Vegetables, there is no problem at all to imagine that
the new concept Fruits or Vegetables is a state which is neither
Fruits nor Vegetables, but a new state, namely the state Fruits or
Vegetables. First of all, if we consider Fruits or Vegetables as a con-
cept in itself, then both Fruits and Vegetables are more concrete
states of this concept. On the other hand – this was even the sin-
gle subject of investigation of Hampton (1988b)—typicalities of
membership of exemplars of Fruits and Vegetables change in ways
that are not compatible with considering Fruits or Vegetables as
a category that would allow being presented as a set theoretic
union of representations of the categories Fruits and Vegetables in
a set theoretic way, and this impossibility is a well-known finger-
print of the presence of quantum structure. Tomato is an exemplar
where this effect can be readily and even intuitively understood;
indeed, it is an exemplar that fits well in the new category Fruits
or Vegetables, because it is an entity that people are likely to have
doubts about when asked to classify it as an exemplar of either
Fruits or Vegetables. Why is there no problem at all to consider
Fruits or Vegetables as a new state, and why is there a problem
to do this for Molecule at spot A or Molecule at spot B? The rea-
son is to be found in a profound difference between the notion
of ‘concept’ and the notion of ‘object’. More specifically, there is
a fundamental difference between the relation that a ‘concept’
can have with the connective ‘or’ and the relation that an ‘object’
can have with the connective ‘or’. Indeed, two concepts, such as
Fruits and Vegetables, when connected by ‘or’, give rise to a con-
cept. However, two objects, when connected by ‘or’, do not give
rise to an object. More concretely, a ‘chair at spot A’ ‘or’ ‘chair
at spot B’ is ‘not’ an object. A mathematician would say that the
set of concepts is closed for the operation of disjunction, while
the set of objects is not. We claim that this is the fundamental
reason why quantum theory will keep leading to situations that
we do not understand, and that we cannot understand, as long as
physical entities are believed to be objects. If, as is the case in our
new quantum interpretation, quantum entities are considered to
be concepts, the problems of understanding the double-slit inter-
ference type of situation disappears. Note that our new quantum
interpretation, and the experiments proving quantum superpo-
sition behavior for macroscopic entities, such as these organic
molecules, entail that these macroscopic entities are concepts
rather than objects, but concepts of such a type that their ‘way of
being’ closely resembles what we imagine objects to be—we will
elaborate on this in the following paragraph. In other words, if
we replace the notion of ‘physical object’ for a quantum entity by
the notion of ‘conceptual entity’, and we interpret the process of
‘a quantum entity becoming more localized’ as a process of ‘this
conceptual entity becoming more concrete’, we can understand
that such a quantum entity as a conceptual entity can be ‘local-
ized in spot A’ ‘or’ ‘localized in spot B’, and that ‘this’ is one of its
genuine ontological states. This is what the ontology of a super-
position state is according to our new quantum interpretation.
The next question that arises is whether our new interpretation
enables us to understand why large conceptual entities gradually
becomemore andmore like objects. The answer is affirmative, for
if we analyze what happens in the human realm with conceptual
entities, we can see a rather surprising phenomenon, which is
that the behavior of larger entities approaches that of objects. For
combinations of human concepts consisting of a small number
of concepts there is, at first sight at least, still a symmetry between
the use of the connective ‘or’ and the use of the connective ‘and’,
both being used more or less in the same way. We can intuitively
understand this when we look at examples of combinations of
two concepts, Fruits and Vegetables. Combining them to give rise
to the new concept Fruits and Vegetables, or combining them to
give rise to the new concept Fruits or Vegetables, takes place on the
same footing, the one not being more special than the other. If,
however, we consider larger sets of combinations of concepts, the
symmetry between the ‘or’ and ‘and’ connective is broken, with
the dominance of ‘and’ increasing as the set of combinations of
concepts grows in size. Let us remark that, although the ‘or’ con-
nective is not compatible with the notion of ‘object’, i.e., object
A ‘or’ object B is not an object, the ‘and’ connective is compatible
with the notion of object. Indeed, object A ‘and’ object B is again
an object, namely the object consisting of both objects A and
B. Let us now consider a typical large set of combinations of
concepts, for example all those that together make up a story.
And let us consider two of such stories, story A and story B.
Then story A ‘and’ story B can still be considered to be a story,
namely a story consisting of the two stories A and B. But story
A ‘or’ story B is not a story. It has no longer the form that we
expect a story to have. So here, on the level of the size of concept
combinations that we call stories, we can intuitively recognize
the breaking of symmetry between ‘and’ and ‘or’. In Aerts (2013)
we explicitly investigated this breaking of symmetry between
‘and’ and ‘or’ in the texts of documents on the World-Wide Web,
and we found the following results. Let us first mention that
the experiment we did on the World-Wide Web took place on
September 15, 2011, using the Yahoo search engine, so that is the
source of our numbers. We found that the asymmetry already
appears at the level of combinations of two concepts. Choosing
two random concepts, Table and Sun, and combining them by
means of ‘and’ and ‘or’, respectively, we found a proportion of 72
to 1, i.e., there were 72 times more documents containing Table
and Sun than documents containing Table or Sun. Larger sets of
combinations of concepts made the proportion go up in favor of
‘and’. However, when we considered some specific combinations,
the proportion shifted in favor of ‘or’. Let us give some examples
of where this was the case: The Window or The Door appeared
2.5 times more often than The Window and The Door, To Laugh
or To Cry appeared 10 times more often than To Laugh and to
Cry, Dead or Alive appeared 100 times more often than Dead
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and Alive, Wants Coffee or Tea appeared 50 times more often
thanWants Coffee and Tea. How to understand this phenomenon
of symmetry breaking? Well, the ‘or’ will remain abundant in
expressions that ‘almost form a concept on their own again’. The
three expressions To Laugh or To Cry, Dead or Alive and Coffee
or Tea are good examples of this. While no new word has been
attributed to them, they abound as ‘stable combinations’ of their
constituent concepts Laugh, Cry, Dead, Alive, Coffee and Tea. In
addition, the combinations of the ‘and’ in the three cases is not
common, since both constituents are opposites. For Laugh and
Cry, and Dead and Alive, this oppositeness is clear, but also in
the case of Coffee and Tea, most of the meaningful sentences on
the World-Wide Web including these two concepts are likely to
refer to situations in which somebody chooses between coffee
‘or’ tea. Although in both cases, of course, also the ‘and’ remains
meaningful, e.g., in sentences such as, “At the party, trays were
carried around with coffee ‘and’ tea to choose from”. The case of
The Window or The Door is interesting too. Although not quite
as strong as in the combinations of Dead and Alive or Coffee and
Tea, there is a certain connection in meaning in the combination
of Window and Door too. One can intuitively understand that
this connection will be stronger in the combination using the
connective ‘or’ (e.g., in the sentence, ‘Will he escape through
the window or the door?’) than in combinations using the
connective ‘and’.
As we can see, the symmetry breaking between ‘or’ and ‘and’
is of a subtle nature. It is not a symmetry breaking that favors
either of them in any definite way. However, when the notions
of story, memory, pieces of text, etc... in the case of human
concepts, and space-filled-with-pieces-of-matter, in the case of
micro-quantum-entities, are taken to be a focus of attention, the
‘and’ becomes dominant with respect to the ‘or’, when it comes
to formation of (i) random new concept combinations, and (ii)
ever larger new concept combinations. The ‘or’ remains domi-
nant for small, abundant stable combinations, and, also for the
formation of new concepts. Indeed, the concept Animal is a com-
bination that makes use of the ‘or’—indeed, it is Dog or Cat or
. . .. However, we do not encounter it in this large combined form
in texts, but as one word Animal. So ‘abstraction’ is an operation
that makes use of the ‘or’. Does this make the ‘or’ dominant if it
comes to the formation of new concepts that are indicated by one
word? Not exactly. For example, the concept Dog is not formed
out of ‘or’ combinations, but rather out of ‘and’ combinations
of more abstract types of events that have not even been given
names of their own. Here are some descriptions Running around
on fast moving legs and wagging its tail, Jumping up against me and
quickly disappearing again, Chasing cats in the garden, etc . . . So,
Dog is formed out of combinations of ‘and’ of many such short-
lasting real-life events. Going back to the realm ofmicro-quantum
entities, we can say that, in our view, the abundance of ‘unstable
particles’ should be interpreted in this way.
Let us extend the analogy to further clarify the state of affairs
with respect to macroscopic quantum phenomena. We already
mentioned that, when thinking of stories as large collections of
combinations of concepts, we have the tendency to allow story A
‘and’ story B to be a story again, namely the two stories A and
B—which is completely similar to how we allow object A and
object B to be an object again, namely the two objects A and
B—, and not to allow symmetry for the ‘or’ in both cases. Indeed,
story A ‘or’ story B is no longer considered to be a story. This,
however, does not mean that we do not encounter specific situ-
ations in everyday life where story A ‘or’ story B represents what
‘is actually happening’ in our cognitive reality. Imagine a situation
where participants in a quiz are shown a small part of a video, and
then asked by the host to choose one from a number of possible
continuations. This quiz situation does not make these alterna-
tive continuations of the story, now combined by the connective
‘or’, into one story again, but it does make this ‘superposition of
stories’ what the candidates are confronted with in their cogni-
tive reality. And every other quiz type of situation will confront
the participants with similar superpositions of concepts not fre-
quently found in documents on the World-Wide Web. We will
now make full use of the explicative potential of our considera-
tion of the analogies of the two realms, viz. human cognition and
micro-quantum, and look again at the experiment in Gerlich et al.
(2011). We can say that, by producing a beam of large organic
molecules that is split into two beamlets when it passes through a
double slit, Gerlich et al. (2011) are putting each of the molecules
into a quiz situation, with respect to spot A and spot B, each
located in one of the beamlets. However, they do not force the
molecules to choose, because they want to measure interference.
So the molecules are allowed to stay in superposition, wonder-
ing which of the two stories proposed by the host of the quiz,
story A ‘or’ story B, to choose, if they were forced to do so. This
is what would happen in Gerlich et al. (2011)’s experiment in
case we attempted to find the molecules in A or B, which would
destroy the interference, as we know from the typical analysis
of the double-slit experiment situation. A real human cognition
analogy for the whole experiment, with interference, would there-
fore be as follows: Someone is in superposition because of the
choice between two possible stories, story A ‘or’ story B, but does
not choose, and is not revealed anything about what happened
either, and is then confronted with a third choice, between C or
not C, which is the equivalent of the molecule being detected or
not being detected. Interference is how the pondering in superpo-
sition between A ‘or’ B influences the choice between C ‘or’ not C.
This is what we modeled for Hampton’s data (Hampton, 1988b)
and the Fruits or Vegetables interference in Aerts (2009b), Section
3 and Figure 4.
We have now reviewed all elements to make the loop back
to the contents of both Section 2 and Section 3, and we will
start with the latter. Saying that statement A—‘standard quan-
tum theory is incomplete, in the sense that it cannot describe
the compound entity consisting of two separated subentities’—
or statement B—‘such a compound entity does not exist or, in
other words, whenever two quantum entities exist, their com-
pound entity is not separated’ —has been shown to be correct
and/or false, would be too simple a statement indeed. We can
clearly illustrate this by pursuing our analogy between the human
conceptual realm and the micro-quantum realm. We will do so
by means of a Gedanken experiment that is easy to perform.
Consider two rooms and two groups of people, each group having
a meeting in one of the rooms. The question we want to con-
sider is a very simple one: “What are the factors that determine
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whether members of one group will be able to understand the
conversation of the other group, and vice versa?” Two obvious
factors will be (a) ‘how loud the people speak that participate in
the meetings’, and (b) ‘how well the rooms are isolated from each
other’. These are also the main factors to consider if the prob-
lem was approached by an architect. Another option would be
to test the rooms without a meeting taking place, making artifi-
cial noise at a given level of decibels in one room, and measure
how loud the noise is in the other room. This goes to show that,
for the realm of human cognition, obviously ‘separated entities
exist’—we just need to provide the walls of the rooms with ade-
quate isolation.—We should add that the two rooms do not even
need to share a common wall, indeed, they might even be rooms
in different houses, so there is no doubt that the two groups can
be separated to the extent that nothing talked about by the one
group can be understood by the other group, and vice versa. What
we proved in Aerts (1982a, 1983a) is that ‘these two well isolated
groups, and their cognitive interactions, cannot be modeled in a
standard quantum theory using the standard Hilbert space for-
malism’. The mathematical structure of Hilbert space warrants
the creation of states that carry correlations in meaning between
the two groups. These are the entangled states. And, coming back
to the more detailed situation of also considering the presence
of dynamical interaction, quite obviously this type of interaction
exists between the objects in both rooms, be it only gravitational
interaction.
What about an analogous situation involving micro-quantum
entities? We believe that the only statement that can be made now
is that ‘we do not know’ because no experiments have been con-
sidered to test which ones of the statements A or B is correct.
Quantum entities have the tendency to entangle whenever they
are in situations where we would also suppose concepts to entan-
gle. Indeed, here too, the analogy with human communication
is enlightening. Humans cannot avoid understanding what other
humans say, whenever a number of conditions are fulfilled. One
such condition is that the loudness of speech is subject to a min-
imum level. But this is certainly not the only condition, because
it also depends on what is being said, for example, whether the
context can be guessed more or less by the listener, or not at all,
as well as on quite a number of other elements connected to the
meaning of what is said. Another factor is probability. Repeated
experiments using the same sentences in one room produce only
probabilistic outcomes, particularly if different humans partic-
ipate in the experiment. What quantum entities do in similar
conditions, when for example a conscious attempt is made to
shield them off, has not been tested. It is relevant at this stage of
our analysis to point out that there is a crucial difference between
the above experiment and an experiment that consists in mea-
suring ‘the distance by which two humans can be separated from
each other in space, such that the one can still understand what
the other is saying, if we are allowed to use any available tech-
nical means to conserve the meaning of the sentences uttered
by the speaker, and to optimize the understanding capacity of
the listener’. An example of the latter kind of experiment is that
of human’s first flight to the Moon in 1968, when Apollo 8 cir-
cled around it and its occupants talked with people on Earth,
over a distance of 400,000 kilometers. And there is no doubt that
much larger distances are possible. Hence, following the above
analysis, we can conclude that statement B might well be false,
and statement A be true. This would mean that separated quan-
tum entities do exist, and that standard quantum theory fails to
model them and is therefore an incomplete theory, albeit not
incomplete in the sense that hidden variables need to be added.
Rather, the incompleteness can be remedied if we move to a
more general quantum-like theory, such as that developed by the
Geneva-Brussels School.
Linking up with our analysis in Section 2, we believe that its
wave-particle line of reasoning is of value, but only in a rela-
tive sense. It would be possible to introduce a notion at least
intuitively similar to that of the de Broglie wavelength. To illus-
trate this, we return to the combination of the concepts Fruits
and Vegetables into Fruits or Vegetables. As Hampton’s measure-
ments data showed (Hampton, 1988b), and as we analyzed in
Aerts (2009a), Section 3, for example Figure 4, there is strong
interference. Fruits or Vegetables really forms a new state of a con-
cept and many exemplars overextend, which means that they are
felt by the participants to fit better in this new concept state than
in any of the two component concept states. Hence, if we had
to think of an analog of the de Broglie wavelength, it would be
natural to consider the ones of Fruits and Vegetables as very over-
lapping, like the ones of electrons inside an atom. In the earlier
example of the different options A and B proposed in the quiz
as continuations of a video fragment, the connective ‘or’ between
both options functions in such a way that when an analog with
the de Broglie wavelength, is made, the wavelength will be very
small. This ‘is’ why we do not consider story A ‘or’ story B as a
new story—their de Broglie waves hardly overlap. An exception
would be if both stories resonate strongly with each other in terms
of meaning content. For example, if one story contains clues to
understand the other story, or vice versa. So, an intuitive analog of
the de Broglie wavelength will depend on many aspects of a piece
of text, particularly its meaning content. Whether two concepts
and/or two texts have overlapping waves will hence also depend
on the degree of resonance between the meanings of the respec-
tive concepts and/or texts. The resonance is likely to be strong
if there are only two simple concepts. But even in the case of
combinations of single concepts, the role played by this aspect is
obvious. We would not be able to find a lot of interference for
randomly chosen concepts, such as Table and Sun, combined into
Table or Sun. Concluding about the de Broglie wavelength type of
reasoning, even for material entities, most probably the reasoning
needs to be considered as a useful guide but also as an idealiza-
tion, certainly for largermaterial entities. So who knows what new
interference experiments will reveal with respect to material enti-
ties of a much bigger size than the organic molecules tested in
Gerlich et al. (2011). The future will have to show.
In the foregoing we analyzed the role of ‘size’ and, more con-
cretely, how larger pieces of text, such as stories, behave more
like objects when compared to smaller pieces of text or single
concepts. For the realm of human cognition, we also indicated
in which way the meaning content of each of the pieces of text
plays a role in their potential for quantum behavior. Amongst the
examples of macroscopic quantum behavior within the realm of
the micro-quantum world, which we described in Section 2, only
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the laser is realized at ‘room temperature’, i.e., in our customary
human environment. At least some of the household appliances
in many of today’s homes have lasers. The quantum behavior of
the other examples, superfluidity, supercurrency, and all realiza-
tions of Bose-Einstein condensates, originally only appear at very
low temperatures. They have not found their way yet to people’s
homes, because of the complicated techniques that are required.
Magnetic Resonance Machines in hospitals make use of supercur-
rents to create very strong magnetic fields used in the imaging.
This means it is likely that quite a number of us, perhaps with-
out being aware of it, have already been in a machine operated
primordially by means of a Bose-Einstein condensate, in the form
of a supercurrent. The fact that the laser is an exception to the
need for strong cooling to realize a material macroscopic quan-
tum entity, is linked to the special nature of photons and their
capacity to escape the disturbances that random packets of heat
energy customarily bring to configurations of matter. How do we
have to understand this ‘disturbance due to heat’ throughout the
analysis we have developed in the foregoing sections?
Before we reflect about this question, we should mention that
quantum experimentalists, definitely wizards of our time, have by
now moved their exploits all the way up to room temperature.
Recently, scientists created a Bose-Einstein condensate, using a
thin non-crystalline polymer film of approximately 35 nanome-
ters thick—for comparison, a sheet of paper is about 100,000
nanometers thick—, in the form of a layer placed between two
mirrors and excited with laser light, and the quantum state was
realized at room temperature. The bosonic particles are created
through interaction of the polymer material and light which
bounces back and forth between the two mirrors. The phe-
nomenon only lasts for a few picoseconds—one trillionth of a
second—, but long enough to use the bosons to create a source
of laser-like light (Plumhof et al., 2014). The realization of this
room-temperature Bose-Einstein condensate is the result of an
ever deeper quantum physical exploration of condensed matter.
The bosons that condensate—appearing all in the same state—are
cavity exiton-polaritons, which are quasi-particles arising from
the coupling of excitons—i.e., bound states of an electron and
an electron hole—and photons. To be able to understand the
meaning of the room-temperature Bose-Einstein condensation,
we should elaborate on what a ‘quasi-particle’ is, as it is now com-
monly used as a notion in condensed matter physics. In principle,
matter consists only of combinations of three quantum parti-
cles, namely electrons, neutrons, and protons. Quasiparticles are
an emergent phenomenon that occurs inside matter as a conse-
quence of the strong interactions that exist between all electrons,
neutrons, and protons, in whatever constellation these appear
inside matter. Hence, a way to look at it is that a quasiparticle is
an idealized substitute for the motions of the real particles inside
matter, which are much too complicated to be able to be mod-
eled. In that sense, quasi-particles are not real particles, e.g., they
cannot exist outside matter. We already encountered such quasi-
particles, namely phonons that play a role in the supercurrency
through cooper-pairing of electrons. In this respect, it should
be noted that according to some ideas in today’s physics com-
munity real quantum particles are considered quasiparticles of
an aether described by the quantum vacuum (Wilczek, 2008),
but independently of these ideas, when we define quantum by
means of the characteristic of its behavior, these quasiparticles
are quantum. And, if we go a step further and define quantum
by means of the nature of the mathematical structure involved in
the modeling of the phenomenon, they are quantum too, because
they are defined by the mathematical formalism of quantum the-
ory itself. We analyze only one example here because it would take
us too far to go into the details of what is happening with respect
to quantum structures in solid state physics, where an abundance
of quantum effects are identified under well-controlled laboratory
conditions (Kasprzak, 2006; Lagoudakis et al., 2008).
Our analysis of the role of temperature in the appearance
of quantum effects makes it relevant to mention the findings
of quantum effect in biology, for example in the process of
photo-synthesis (Engel et al., 2007; Sarovar et al., 2010; Scholes,
2010). The quantum effect identified in biology are ‘at room
temperature’—or more correctly, at earth crust temperature.
Given the above, the question arises, What about the role of
temperature? We do believe that the original reasoning related
to the de Broglie wavelength, which we put forward in detail
in Section 2, namely that temperature, being a measure of the
random behavior of energy, is a disturbing factor destroying the
potential for quantum coherence, is true to a great extent, but
needs to be generalized. To be more concrete, it explains why
cars on a highway —and chairs and tables in our living rooms—
do not quantum cohere as macroscopic material entities within
their natural environment, which is an environment where their
intrinsic quantum nature as entities is too much disturbed by
random packets of heat energy bombarding them. But, why then
do there appear quantum effects of coherence, in biological enti-
ties (Engel et al., 2007; Sarovar et al., 2010; Scholes, 2010)—in
photo-synthesis, but most probably also in many other biologi-
cal processes yet to discover—, and in solid state matter entities
at room temperature (Plumhof et al., 2014) in controlled labora-
tory conditions? Could it be that the temperature should not be
looked upon as providing an objective scale indicating the situ-
ations favorable for the appearance of quantum effect? In fact, if
we reflect about the explanation of how temperature is destructive
for the presence of quantum coherence, the answer is contained
in it. It is because of the disturbing effect of the random bombard-
ment of heat energy packets that quantum coherence disappears.
The size of this bombardment depends crucially on the temper-
ature, and hence not on whether an entity is a plant making use
of photo-synthesis or whether an entity is the chair or table in
our living room, or a car on the highway. However, could it not
be that the plant has managed to be less disturbed by this bom-
bardment of random heat packets of energy in the processes that
enable it to use photosynthesis, and that this capacity hence could
lead to the presence of quantum effects? Of course this is possible,
and even plausible, if we take into account the mechanism of bio-
logical evolution that has played a fundamental role in what the
plant is, and how photo-synthesis works. Does this also explain
the appearance of quantum effect in human laboratories at room
temperature? Indeed, human culture is also an evolutionary pro-
cess, albeit not Darwinian. It has not only managed resistance
against the random bombardment of heat energy packets, but
also evolved to use this heat energy and make it into non-random
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energy. Human’s energy-harvesting from heat started with the
first steam engine, which literally is the transformation of random
energy into structured energy. Does this produce quantum struc-
ture too? Not always, and not automatically, but this is certainly
the case for the energy used in those laboratories that have pro-
duced quantum effect at room-temperature. What about the
vessels of water and other macroscopic situations we invented to
violate Bell’s inequalities (Aerts, 1982b, 1991; Aerts et al., 2000),
and the identification of quantum structure in cognition (Aerts
and Aerts, 1995; Gabora and Aerts, 2002; Aerts and Gabora,
2005a,b; Aerts, 2009b; Aerts and Sozzo, 2011; Sozzo, 2014)? Well,
the vessels of water and the other entities violating Bell’s inequal-
ities are realized within human culture, so that they can be said
to have been specially devised to violate Bell’s inequalities, albeit
not in explicit laboratory situations. In doing so, they make use of
all knowledge available to achieve this. As regards the presence of
quantum structure in human cognition, we note that human cog-
nition is a product of human culture, and hence profits from the
mechanism of cultural evolution to fight the random destructive
effect of bombardments of energy packets of heat.
Does this mechanism of cultural evolution strive specifically
toward a presence of quantum structure? In this respect, we can-
not but refer to the second law of thermodynamics, which states
that, for a closed entity, entropy never decreases. To cool down
the atoms in a gas for the realization of a Bose-Einstein conden-
sate, experimentalists need to create an enormous decrease of the
entropy of the gas. Of course, this is not in contradiction with the
second law of thermodynamics, since the gas is not a closed entity
during the experiment. Erwin Schrödinger, one of the founding
fathers of quantum theory, wrote a seminal book, entitled ‘What
is life’, in which he puts forward several ideas on the nature of life.
One of his ideas was that the order that characterizes life is realized
as a decrease of entropy within a non-closed entity, while another
one is about the genetic code being guarded within an aperiodic
crystal, later to be identified as DNA. The way Schrödinger arrived
at the second idea is interesting for the line of reasoning devel-
oped in the present article. According to Schrödinger’s analysis,
the carrier of replicated information for life must have sufficient
stability and permanence, and must therefore be solid, a gas or
a liquid not being suitable. Solids are crystals, except if they are
liquids with a very high viscosity. However, crystals are repeti-
tive structures, hence much less capable of coding a big amount
of information, which is why Schrödinger argued that an ‘aperi-
odic crystal’ should be the principle element in the process of life.
This aperiodic crystal for all life existing on earth turned out to
be Deoxyribonucleic acid or DNA. It is a nucleic acid in the form
of a double-stranded helix, consisting of two long biopolymers
made of simpler units called nucleotides, each of which is com-
posed of a nucleobase of one of the following four types, guanine,
adenine, thymine, or cytosine, with the letters G, A, T, and C, are
used to indicate the bases. What is interesting for our analysis is
that the letters G, A, T, and C, are customarily referred to as ele-
ments of an alphabet. But is not the alphabet a human invention
characteristic of the written language? Let us note in this respect
that the oldest written languages, Chinese and its variants, do not
use an alphabet but symbols that directly indicate the meaning
carriers themselves, i.e. the words—or parts of words. The origin
of the alphabet goes back to Egyptian writing, which had a set
of some 24 hieroglyphs to represent syllables that begin with a
single consonant of their language. But it would be wrong, at
least with respect to the analysis we are making, to connect the
mechanism of introducing an alphabet specifically to written lan-
guage. Indeed, the real challenge to human culture in this respect
dates back much further, to the advent and development of lan-
guage itself, i.e., spoken language. This challenge was to express
an enormous amount of meaning by using only a very limited
number of basic sounds—the consonants and vowels of spoken
language, which are also the items to which later written alphabets
correspond—, and making combinations of these basic sounds to
create meaning carriers, i.e. words, sentences and longer pieces of
language. It is an example where human culture has taken a path
similar or better, in prolongation of, life.
And what about quantum structures? Let us say that we can
still distinguish two types of their appearance in the practice of
scientists involved, a distinction that is also made in the rele-
vant scientific literature. The first type of appearance is when it
is identified by scientists as ‘climbing out of its natural environ-
ment, which is the micro-world, or, in case of the macro-world,
a world where the disturbing factor of heat is taken away, hence
a very cold world’. We can find examples in how it is currently
being encountered in widely separatedmicro-entities (Tittel et al.,
1998; Salart et al., 2008), large organic molecules, (Gerlich et al.,
2011), in room-temperature states of solids (Lagoudakis et al.,
2008; Plumhof et al., 2014) and in biological entities (Engel
et al., 2007; Sarovar et al., 2010; Scholes, 2010). The second
type of appearance is when it is identified by scientists by
looking at the intrinsic structure of the reliable models of its
behavior—for example, whether Bell’s inequalities are violated,
whether interference and/or entanglement can be identified in the
data—, independently of whether there is a suspicion of ‘climb-
ing out of its natural environment’. Examples of this are how
it is being encountered today in ordinary macroscopic entities
(Aerts, 1982b, 1991), cognition (Aerts and Aerts, 1995; Gabora
and Aerts, 2002; Aerts and Gabora, 2005a,b; Aerts, 2009b; Pothos
and Busemeyer, 2009; Busemeyer et al., 2011; Busemeyer and
Bruza, 2012; Sozzo, 2014), economics and biology (Bruza et al.,
2007, 2008, 2009; Khrennikov, 2010; Song et al., 2011). Our pro-
posal, following the above analysis, is that both are not different
in essence, and hence the need to investigate whether it would be
possible to connect the appearance of quantum structure with the
presence of organized parts of the world—organizedmatter, orga-
nized life and organized culture—, and by ‘organized’ we mean
‘able to conquer the random influences that destroy quantum
coherence’—such as random packets of heat energy—, but this
should only be one of the examples in such a broader view (Aerts
and Sozzo, 2014). It will of course be necessary to thoroughly
investigate the connections with the second law of thermodynam-
ics and evolution theory to work out this view further and in
greater depth.
The following brief comment is about the philosophical status
of the quantum conceptual interpretation which we have used as
an element of the analysis presented here (Aerts, 2009a, 2010a,b,
2013), and about the philosophical status of the analysis itself.
It might be thought that this quantum conceptual interpretation
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presupposes an idealistic philosophical stance. Let us make clear
that this is not what we believe to be true a priori. The aforemen-
tioned Geneva-Brussels School quantum theory was conceived,
certainly in its original formulation, within a philosophical stance
of ‘non naive realism’. Indeed, one of its philosophical aims was
to prove that a realistic philosophical view is compatible with
quantum theory. When I first started to reflect about the idea
that ‘quantum entities might well be conceptual entities’, this
was not with an inclination toward idealism as a philosophi-
cal stance. There is a subtle but very easy point to be made in
this respect, which clearly shows the difference between a real-
ist view on conceptuality and a possible idealist one. Indeed, we
can again consider the same example which we have used so
many times now to make things clear, namely the situation in
the human realm. When two humans talk to each other, they
exchange sentences of concepts and their aim, usually, is to trans-
fer meaning. This process is ‘really’ taking place, within ‘ordinary
daily reality’. The concepts that are used in such a conversation
are ‘real’. ‘That’ is how I have been considering quantum entities
to be conceptual entities, namely as ‘real entities’ of a concep-
tual nature, engaging in an exchange of ‘real meaning’ between
pieces of matter, functioning as proto-memory entities. In exactly
the same way that human conversations as processes of exchange
between real memory structures, i.e., human minds, material-
ized in human brains, but also computer memories, making use
of concept combinations in a real language, ‘exist’—in the usual
sense of the word—, one can imagine that quantum entities are
really existing conceptual entities mediating between really exist-
ing proto-memory structures which are pieces of baryonic matter.
Within such a, what I would like to call in a somewhat challenging
way, ‘non-naive realist view on conceptuality’, there is no differ-
ence in principle between the two realms with respect to their
‘nature of reality’. Any further philosophical question about the
deeper nature of the foundations of one of the two realms can
be translated right away into the same philosophical question
about the deeper nature of the foundations of the other realm.
A platonic type of question of whether concepts exist prior to
physical objects—and in our interpretation such physical objects
are also conceptual, we will get to this shortly—can equally well
be put on the table in both realms, the one of human commu-
nication, or the one of micro-physical conceptuality, following
from our quantum interpretation. However, it is not necessary
at all to make such a philosophical choice between idealism and
conceptual realism to understand and explain what we wanted to
understand and explain in the first place. Human culture and how
it evolved can be fully understood and explained by ‘only’ suppos-
ing the existence of the conceptual entities that ‘have come into
existence through a historically real human exchange’. Or again,
to make the same distinction, but this time focusing on the writ-
ten conceptual structures, human culture, and its evolution, can
be fully explained by considering the books that really have been
written, as well as the libraries containing them. Idealism is rea-
soning about the conversations that ‘could have taken place’, and
the ‘books that could have been written’. A realist would say that
‘these do not exist’, but indeed ‘could have existed’, but that is a
differentmatter. Of course, the above, showing that a realist philo-
sophical view on conceptuality is possible, does not prove that the
world is as such. The more conceptual entities play an important
role on a fundamental level, as in the case of what concerns my
conceptual quantum interpretation, the more it becomes natural
to also wonder about the possibility of an idealist philosophical
stance as a foundation. Let us be more specific about the con-
ceptual status regarding pieces of baryonic matter, although this
does seem to imply that there is no possibility for objects to play
any role as foundational elements, philosophically speaking, this
is not true either. Let me again illustrate this bymeans of a specific
possibility, e.g., the strong resistance in unifying gravitation with
quantum theory might well indicate that on the level of where
gravitation works ‘objects’ in the traditional sense do exist, and
that it is only on the level of where quantum theory works that
conceptuality is the rule. I do not want to exclude such a possi-
bility at this stage of research with respect to it. In this sense, to
make the above more specific, I would prefer not to have to opt
a priori for a specific philosophical stance within this quantum
conceptual interpretation, but rather leave it to further research
to gather new experimental data, and ways to explain them, to
give weight to the different possible philosophical stances. This
does not mean that it would not be interesting to already consider
these different stances taking explicitly into account this quan-
tum conceptual interpretation as well, and I am planning to write
about this in future work.
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